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IT'S NOT EASY BEING GREEN: METROPOLITAN TAXICAB
REVEALS HURDLES POSED BY FEDERAL
PREEMPTION TO STATE AND LOCAL
ENVIRONMENTAL INITIATIVES
I. INTRODUCTION
Being green has never before been so popular.1 From the su-
permarket to the office park, and from the classroom to the con-
struction site, a wave of environmentalism is sweeping the nation.2
The justifications for going "green" range from the selfish to the
altruistic: cutting energy costs during hard economic times, mitigat-
ing the country's dependence on foreign oil, and combating cli-
mate change through the reduction of so-called carbon footprints.3
Regardless of why many Americans are becoming environmentally
conscious, scientists welcome this behavioral shift because of the
harmful implications of maintaining the status quo.4
1. For examples of the increasing popularity of environmentally friendly be-
havior, see infra note 2.
2. See, e.g., Andrew Martin, Whole Foods Chain to Stop Use of Plastic Bags, N.Y.
TiMES, Jan. 23, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/O1/23/business/23bags.
html?fta=y (reporting supermarket chain's decision to offer customers only re-
cycled paper or reusable grocery bags); Bryan Walsh, The Four-Day Workweek is Win-
ning Fans, TIME, Sept. 7, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,91
71,1919162,00.html (describing how Utah's government offices being closed on
Fridays reduces energy costs and cuts greenhouse gas emissions); Laurie Tarkan,
Where Green Gets High Marks, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2009, http://query.nytimes.com/
gst/fullpage.html?res=9B07EODF143DF935A15757COA96F9C8B63 (recounting
one elementary school's efforts to reduce waste, save energy, and recycle supplies);
Abby Gruen, Trend in Green Building Accelerates in Westchester, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/18/nyregion/westchester/18greenwe.
html (detailing green building trend within one New York county).
3. See FuelEconomy.gov, Why is Fuel Economy Important?, http://fuel
economy.gov/feg/why.shtml (last visited Feb. 28, 2010) (suggesting various rea-
sons to be aware of vehicle fuel efficiency).
4. See, e.g., U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Climate Change Frequent Questions -
Effects, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/fq/effects.html#q3 (last visited Feb.
28, 2010) (enumerating likely detrimental consequences of climate change).
Warming global temperatures are expected to have a predominately negative im-
pact on biodiversity, with some ecosystems already affected. Id. In terms of human
health, more heat-related deaths and illness, as well as a higher incidence of insect-
borne disease, may result from climate change. Id. Rising sea levels, caused by
melting glaciers, may contribute to enhanced coastal erosion and an increased risk
of property loss from storm surges. Id. Moreover, scientists expect climate change
to cause an increase in the number of heat waves, more intense hurricanes, and a
greater likelihood of floods and droughts. Id.
(325)
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One notable place where individuals are increasingly going
green is America's roadways, which have long allowed personal au-
tomobiles to be the greatest polluter in cities nationwide. 5 Accord-
ing to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), "[d] riving
a private car is probably a typical citizen's most 'polluting' daily ac-
tivity" between the vehicle's exhaust and the evaporation of its
fuel. 6 Burning fossil fuels, such as gasoline and diesel, releases car-
bon dioxide and other greenhouse gases into the atmosphere that
contribute to climate change. 7 Consequently, the emissions from
passenger cars and trucks account for at least one-fifth of U.S. car-
bon dioxide emissions and nearly one-third of the country's total
air pollution. 8 Although efforts by the federal government and au-
tomotive industry have greatly reduced vehicle emissions since
1970, this progress has been effectively wiped out as the number of
miles driven by Americans doubled during the same period.9
One widely embraced solution to this dilemma is hybrid-elec-
tric vehicles (hybrids), which have greater fuel economy and lower
emissions than conventional automobiles because they utilize both
a gasoline engine and an electric motor.10 Since the first hybrid car
5. See OFFICE OF MOBILE SOURCES, U.S. ENvrL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 400-F-92-
007, AUTOMOBILE EMISSIONS: AN OVERVIEW 1 (1994), http://www.epa.gov/otaq/
consumer/05-autos.pdf [hereinafter AUTOMOBILE EMISSIONS] (describing relation-
ship between cars and pollution).
6. Id. (reiterating link between driving and pollution).
7. See FuelEconomy.gov, Reduce Climate Change, http://www.fueleconomy.
gov/feg/climate.shtml (last visited Feb. 28, 2010) (explaining connection between
driving, greenhouse gas emissions, and climate change).
8. See OFFICE OF TRANSP. & AIR QUALITY, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 420-
F-01-006, GREEN VEHICLE GUIDE 1 (2001), http://www.epa.gov/otaq/consumer/
f01006.pdf (quantifying aggregate pollution from American cars and trucks).
Trucks include pickups, minivans, vans and sport utility vehicles. Id.
9. See AUTOMOBILE EMISSIONS, supra note 5, at 4 (describing limited progress
of emission controls to date). On-road carbon monoxide emissions are less than
half of what they were in 1970 and five times less than they would have been with-
out the controls that have been implemented since then. See U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, On-Road Sources, http://www.epa.gov/otaq/invntory/overview/results/
onroad.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2010) (depicting impact of regulatory controls on
on-road vehicle emissions). EPA studies also show that today's cars emit seventy to
ninety percent less pollution for each mile driven than their 1970 counterparts as a
result of advancements in vehicle and fuel technology. See U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, Solutions that Reduce Pollution, http://www.epa.gov/otaq/invntory/
overview/solutions/vechengines.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2010) (applauding
technological improvements for reducing vehicle emissions).
10. See FuelEconomy.gov, How Hybrids Work, http://www.fueleconomy.gov/
feg/hybridtech.shtml (last visited Feb. 28, 2010) (explaining technology behind
hybrid-electric vehicles). While gas-electric hybrids are the most popular fuel-effi-
cient vehicles, car companies are also actively developing and marketing entirely
electric cars as well as plug-in hybrids. See Hiroko Tabuchi, Industry Slumps, but
Prius Inspires Waiting List, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/
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became commercially available in the U.S. in 1999, over 1.5 million
hybrids have been sold, and manufacturers expect continued
growth in this sector of the otherwise-distressed automotive indus-
try.11 Federal tax incentives have encouraged the sale of hybrids
since the mid-2000s, but many of these programs have since ended
or are being phased out without decreasing the vehicles' popularity
among consumers.12
Despite the current strength of the environmental movement,
the road to going green is a bumpy one, riddled with legislative
potholes, influential pedestrians and other obstacles slowing the
country's progress.13 Environmental initiatives of cities and states,
in particular, have been hindered by recent court decisions finding
these efforts preempted by federal law. 14 One such case is Metropoli-
tan Taxicab Board of Trade v. City of New York (Metropolitan Taxicab),15
in which the District Court for the Southern District of New York
2009/06/13/business/global/13prius.html [hereinafter Industry Slumps] (describ-
ing Toyota's market strategy regarding hybrids).
11. See HybridCars.com, November 2009 Dashboard: 10th Anniversary of US
Hybrid Market, Dec. 11, 2009, http://www.hybridcars.com/hybrid-sales-dash-
board/november-2009-dashboard.html (estimating total number of hybrids cur-
rently on U.S. roads). Although the world's first mass-produced hybrid-electric
vehicle, the Toyota Prius, became available in Japan in 1997, it did not hit the U.S.
market until the year after the U.S. release of the Honda Insight in 1999. See
HybridCars.com, History of Hybrid Vehicles, Mar. 27, 2006, http://
www.hybridcars.com/history/history-of-hybrid-vehicles.html (providing timeline of
events related to hybrid vehicles). One auto analyst recently projected that global
sales of eco-friendly vehicles could grow from 0.8 million in 2009 to 11.2 million in
2020. See Hiroko Tabuchi, Toyota to Sell Plug-In Hybrid in 2011, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/15/business/global/I5toyota.html
(describing expert predictions of changes within auto industry).
12. See generally FuelEconomy.gov, New Energy Tax Credits for Hybrids, http:/
/www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/tax-hybrid.shtml (last visited Feb. 28, 2010) (supply-
ing deadlines and other pertinent information about government tax credits). Al-
though Prius sales are down sharply from when gasoline prices topped $4 per
gallon, waiting lists accumulated at some U.S. car dealers for Toyota's newest Prius
model for more than a year. See Industy Slumps, supra note 10. Hybrid sales in
November 2009 accounted for 2.8% of total U.S. car sales and were 21% higher
than a year earlier despite growth in the overall market remaining essentially flat.
See HybridCars.com, November 2009 Dashboard: 10th Anniversary of US Hybrid
Market, Dec. 11, 2009, http://www.hybridcars.com/hybrid-sales-dashboard/no-
vember-2009-dashboard.html (comparing annual hybrids sales).
13. For a discussion of the hurdles faced by state and local environmental
initiatives, see infra notes 172-82 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246
(2004) (finding state motor vehicle pollution standards preempted by Clean Air
Act); Ophir v. City of Boston, 647 F. Supp. 2d 86 (D. Mass. 2009) (finding local fuel
efficiency ordinance preempted by Energy Policy and Conservation Act).
15. 633 F. Supp. 2d 83 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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struck down the city's attempt to move toward exclusively hybrid
taxicabs. 16
This Note evaluates the district court's decision in Metropolitan
Taxicab and reflects on its implications for state and local environ-
mental initiatives. Part II discusses the factual background and pro-
cedural history of this case. 17 Part III provides an overview of two
pertinent federal statutes, the doctrine of preemption, and the lim-
ited amount of applicable case law.' 8 Part IV describes the district
court's reasoning in Metropolitan Taxicab.19 Part V scrutinizes the
outcome of this case and explains why the court's overall decision
was sound even though particular points could have been ad-
dressed in greater detail.20 Finally, Part VI predicts the impact that
this decision will have on environmental federalism and suggests
various courses of action still available to cities and states following
Metropolitan Taxicab.2 1
II. FACTS
In 2003, New York City first acted to incorporate hybrid vehi-
cles into its taxicab fleet by enacting a law permitting the city's Taxi-
cab and Limousine Commission (TLC) to issue additional taxicab
licenses if at least nine percent were granted to fuel-efficient vehi-
cles. 2 2 The TLC only began approving hybrids for use as taxicabs in
16. See Michael M. Grynbaum, Judge Blocks City's Penalty for Nonhybrid Cab Own-
ers, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/O6/23/nyregion/
23taxi.html (relating decision of U.S. District Judge Paul A. Crotty striking down
New York City's most recent taxicab regulations).
17. For a further discussion of the facts of Metropolitan Taxicab, see infra notes
22-52 and accompanying text.
18. For a further discussion of the legal background applicable to Metropolitan
Taxicab, see infra notes 53-104 and accompanying text.
19. For a narrative analysis of the court's decision, see infra notes 105-34 and
accompanying text.
20. For a critical analysis of the court's decision in Metropolitan Taxicab, see
infra notes 135-61 and accompanying text.
21. For a further discussion of the potential impact of this case, see infra notes
162-82 and accompanying text.
22. See Opinion & Order, Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York, No. 08
Civ. 7837 (PAC), 2008 WL 4866021, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2008) (portraying
history of city's efforts to have more hybrid taxicabs). Created in 1971, the TLC "is
the agency responsible for licensing and regulating New York City's medallion (yel-
low) taxicabs, for-hire vehicles (community-based liveries and black cars), com-
muter vans, paratransit vehicles (ambulettes) and certain luxury limousines." New
York City Taxi & Limousine Commission, About TLC, http://www.nyc.gov/html/
tlc/html/about/about.shtml (last visited Feb. 28, 2010) (describing functions of
TLC). According to the city's Charter, one purpose of the TLC is to establish an
overall public transportation policy governing the vehicles under its purview. See
Metro. Taxicab, 2008 WL 4866021, at *2. The TLC notably has the power to set
4
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October 2005, however, after adopting new requirements regarding
interior room.23 On May 22, 2007, one month after introducing a
broad package of environmental initiatives dubbed "PlaNYC 2030,"
Mayor Michael Bloomberg announced that the city planned to turn
its taxicab fleet completely hybrid by 2012.24 While nearly 1,500 of
the city's 13,237 yellow taxicabs were already hybrids, the remain-
der consisted primarily of Ford's Crown Victoria model, which aver-
ages twelve to fourteen miles per gallon (mpg).25
The TLC accordingly adopted new rules (25/30 Rules) on De-
cember 11, 2007, that established minimum fuel economy require-
ments for all new taxicabs. 26 These rules called for new taxicabs to
be either wheelchair accessible or to have a minimum city rating of
twenty-five mpg by October 1, 2008, with a scheduled increase to
thirty mpg by October 1, 2009.27 While the 25/30 Rules did not
explicitly require a switch to hybrids, only vehicles with hybrid-elec-
tric or clean diesel engines were capable of meeting these mini-
mum mileage requirements. 28 With mandatory retirement for New
York City taxicabs every three to five years, depending on use, the
TLC regulations would have resulted in a virtually all-hybrid taxicab
fleet by 2012.29
Shortly before the first deadline of the 25/30 Rules, various
parties related to the taxicab industry filed suit in federal court
seeking an injunction.30 On October 31, 2008, the District Court
standards for taxicabs regarding safety, design, comfort, convenience, noise and
air pollution, as well as efficiency. See id.
23. See Metro. Taxicab, 2008 WL 4866021, at *3 (explaining how hybrids did
not meet TLC's previous interior room requirements for taxicabs).
24. See id. (discussing origin of New York City's first attempt to make its taxi-
cab fleet completely hybrid). Among the many goals of "PlaNYC 2030," New York
City hopes to reduce its global warming emissions by thirty percent and achieve
the cleanest air of any major U.S. city by 2030. See NYC.gov, PlaNYC Background,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc203O/html/challenge/challenge.shtml (last vis-
ited Feb. 28, 2010) (stating objectives of New York City's ambitious environmental
initiatives).
25. See Sewell Chan, Judge Blocks Hybrid Taxi Requirement, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31,
2008, http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/10/31/judge-blocks-hybrid-taxi-
requirement/#more-4613 (providing makeup of New York City's taxicab fleet).
For a definition of "fuel economy," see infra note 62.
26. See Metro. Taxicab Opinion, 2008 WL 4866021, at *2 (revealing origin and
adoption of TLC's 25/30 Rules).
27. See id. (explicating provisions of 25/30 Rules).
28. See id. at *2 (clarifying impact of minimum mileage requirements).
29. See id. (illustrating eventual implications of 25/30 Rules).
30. See id. at *1 (providing full list of parties involved in lawsuit). The plain-
tiffs included: Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, a trade association made up
of yellow medallion taxi fleets in New York City; Midtown Operating Corp., a pri-
vate yellow taxicab garage that leases taxis to hundreds of independent contrac-
2010]
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for the Southern District of New York granted the plaintiffs' motion
for a preliminary injunction in part because the plaintiffs would be
irreparably harmed if forced to comply with the new rules. 31 The
court further held that the plaintiffs had demonstrated they were
likely to succeed in showing that these rules were preempted by the
federal Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA).32 Notably, the
court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the TLC regulations
were also preempted by the federal Clean Air Act (CAA).33
Disappointed by this roadblock in his administration's attempt
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, Mayor Bloomberg lashed out
against the "archaic Washington regulations" behind the ruling for
preventing cities "from choosing to create cleaner air and a health-
ier place to live. ' ' 34 The mayor elaborated, "The sad irony here is
that the laws being relied on by the plaintiff [s] ... were designed to
reduce air pollution and reduce our dependence on foreign oil,
which is exactly what moving to fuel efficient cabs will do."3 5 Deter-
mined to find a detour to achieving a cleaner taxicab fleet, Mayor
Bloomberg instructed the TLC to develop a program of financial
incentives and disincentives to promote the use of fuel-efficient
vehicles.3 6
On March 26, 2009, the TLC repealed the 25/30 Rules and
enacted new regulations (Lease Cap Rules) that altered the maxi-
mum lease rate vehicle owners could charge drivers for leasing taxi-
cabs in twelve-hour shifts.3 7 First, these regulations reduced the
tors; Sweet Irene Transportation Co., Inc., a private corporate that owns and leases
taxis; Ossman Ali, a self-employed independent contractor who buys, leases, and
drives taxis; and Kevin Healy, a frequent taxi passenger. See id. The defendants
included: the City of New York; the TLC; Mayor Michael Bloomberg, in his official
capacity; Matthew Daus, in his capacity as Commissioner, Chair, and Chief Execu-
tive Officer of the TLC; Peter Schenkman, in his capacity as the Assistant Commis-
sioner for Safety and Emissions of the TLC; and Andrew Salkin, in his capacity as
TLC First Deputy Commissioner. See id.
31. See Metro. Taxicab, 2008 WL 4866021, at *15 (granting plaintiffs' motion
for preliminary injunction against 25/30 Rules).
32. See id. (holding that EPCA preempts 25/30 Rules). For a further discus-
sion of the EPCA, see infra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
33. See id. at *14 (finding that CAA does not preempt 25/30 Rules). For a
further discussion of the CAA, see infra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
34. Chan, supra note 25 (quoting Mayor Bloomberg's response to decision
striking down 25/30 Rules).
35. Id. (elaborating on Mayor Bloomberg's qualms with district court's
decision).
36. See id. (observing Mayor Bloomberg's resolve to turn taxicab fleet com-
pletely hybrid through different approach than 25/30 Rules).
37. See Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York, 633 F. Supp. 2d 83, 88-89
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting origins of Lease Cap Rules). Prior to the new TLC regula-
tions, the maximum lease rates were "$105 for all day shifts; $115 for the night shift
6
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maximum lease rate, otherwise known as the lease cap, for all taxi-
cabs that were not hybrids, clean diesel, or wheelchair accessible 38
An initial reduction of $4 per shift was scheduled to go into effect
on May 1, 2009, with the reduction increasing to $8 per shift on
May 1, 2010, and $12 per shift on May 1, 2011.39 Second, the regu-
lations raised the lease cap by $3 per shift for vehicles meeting cer-
tain specifications. 40 Although the Lease Cap Rules did not
expressly mandate the purchase of hybrids, the only vehicles that
met the specifications warranting an increase were the same hybrids
that satisfied the abandoned 25/30 Rules. 4'
According to the city, the Lease Cap Rules corrected a struc-
tural disincentive preventing many taxicab owners from switching
their fleets to hybrid vehicles. 42 Under the existing framework of
regulations and industry custom, taxicab drivers, rather than vehi-
cle owners, paid for gasoline.43 With fuel costs therefore irrelevant
to owners, and the cost of transforming a hybrid into a taxicab
higher than transforming a conventional vehicle, most owners re-
sorted to purchasing the cheaper, time-tested Crown Victoria.44
Hence, the goal of the Lease Cap Rules was to shift the cost of gaso-
line, which is higher for conventional vehicles, from drivers to own-
ers by reducing the lease income of those who owned nonhybrid
taxicabs. 45
Mayor Bloomberg was not ambiguous about his intentions with
the new TLC regulations: "By offering incentives that will en-
courage more taxi fleet owners to purchase hybrids, we have found
another avenue to reach our goal of greening our yellow cabs, im-
on Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday; $120 for the night shift on Wednesday; and
$129 for the night shifts on Thursday, Friday, and Saturday." Id. at 89.
38. See id. at 89 (illuminating details of Lease Cap Rules).
39. See id. (describing financial disincentives within Lease Cap Rules).
40. See id. (detailing financial incentive within Lease Cap Rules).
41. See id. (exposing underlying goal of new financial incentive).
42. See Metro. Taxicab, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 90 (sharing New York City's justifica-
tion for Lease Cap Rules).
43. See id. (examining existing financial arrangement between taxicab owners
and taxicab drivers).
44. See id. (highlighting result of system in which taxicab drivers pay fuel costs
rather than taxicab owners).
45. See id. (explaining cost-shifting purpose of Lease Cap Rules). The TLC
calculated the amount of its financial incentives and disincentives by comparing
the approximate costs of gasoline, the approximate costs of purchasing and con-
verting a hybrid into a taxicab, the maximum number of shifts per year, and the
average fuel economy of a Crown Victoria with the same attributes of a Ford Es-
cape, the most popular brand of hybrid taxicab. See id. at 90-91.
2010]
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proving our air quality, and reducing our carbon emissions."46 As
the TLC Commissioner elaborated, the Lease Cap Rules were ex-
pected to "incentivize the purchase of cleaner vehicles, while ensur-
ing that taxi drivers are not penalized because a taxicab owner is
reluctant to make the wiser purchase of a hybrid vehicle."47 Once
again, however, members of the taxi industry challenged the TLC
regulations shortly before the revised first deadline. 48
On April 17, 2009, the trade association that had opposed the
25/30 Rules, as well as various taxicab fleet owners, filed an
amended complaint. 49 The plaintiffs alleged that the Lease Cap
Rules, much like the 25/30 Rules, were preempted by the EPCA
and CAA because they were "essentially a mandate to purchase vehi-
cles with a certain mpg or emissions rating."50 After the plaintiffs
moved for a preliminary injunction, an evidentiary hearing was
held on May 20, 2009, to determine the effect of the Lease Cap
Rules on the plaintiffs and whether the rules indeed forced the
plaintiffs to purchase hybrids.51 Granting the plaintiffs' motion on
June 22, 2009, the district court held that the plaintiffs had demon-
strated irreparable harm and a likelihood of success in showing that
both the EPCA and CAA preempted the defacto mandate imposed
by the TLC's new regulations. 52
46. Press Release, Office of the Mayor, Bloomberg Announces New Incen-
tive/Disincentive Program to Reach Goal of Green Taxi Fleet (Nov. 14, 2008),
http://www.nyc.gov/ (search for "Bloomberg Announces New Incentive/Disin-
centive Program to Reach Goal of Green Taxi Fleet" and follow "Press Release -
Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg" hyperlink in search results) (announcing aim of
Lease Cap Rules).
47. Id. (declaring anticipated consequences of Lease Cap Rules).
48. See Metro. Taxicab, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 91 (discussing initiation of most re-
cent legal action).
49. See id. (describing plaintiffs' suit to prevent enforcement of Lease Cap
Rules). The plaintiffs specifically consisted of Metropolitan Taxicab Board of
Trade, Midtown Car Leasing Corp., Bath Cab Corp., Ronart Leasing Corp., Geid
Cab Corp., Linden Maintenance Corp., and Ann Taxi Inc. See id. at 83. Together,
the plaintiffs controlled one-quarter of all taxicabs in New York City. See id. at 91.
For a list of the defendants, which were identical in the initial complaint, see supra
note 30.
50. Metro. Taxicab, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 91 (offering plaintiffs' claims in support
of injunction against Lease Cap Rules).
51. See id. (relating procedural posture of case).
52. See id. at 105-06 (granting preliminary injunction and holding Lease Cap
Rules preempted by EPCA and CAA).
8




The U.S. federal government has not always been at the fore-
front of protecting the environment. 53 With the government un-
willing to inhibit technological or economic progress for the better
part of the nation's history, the only possible redress for environ-
mental transgressions came from common law actions. 54 Begin-
ning with President Theodore Roosevelt, the federal government
began taking on greater regulatory powers throughout the twenti-
eth century.55 Nevertheless, unbridled growth of various industries
by the 1950s created highly visible forms of pollution and rendered
the traditional method of addressing environmental grievances
inadequate. 56
Ultimately, the federal government responded to growing con-
cern about the environment by creating the EPA in 1970. 5 7 Con-
gress passed the CAA that same year, directing the EPA to set
national air standards. 58 Following the 1973-1974 Arab oil embargo
and resulting energy crisis in the U.S., Congress passed the EPCA in
1975. 59 The EPCA's primary legislative goals were energy conserva-
tion and efficiency, but in practice these efforts offered additional
environmental protections. 60 While the CAA and EPCA grant dif-
ferent powers to the federal government, their regulation of vehi-
53. See Jack Lewis, Looking Backward: A Historical Perspective on Environmental
Regulations, EPAJouRNAL, Mar. 1988, available at http://www.epa.gov/history/top-
ics/regulate/O1.htm (narrating historical background on U.S. environmental
regulations).
54. See id. (noting initial difficulty of redressing environmental grievances).
55. See id. (illustrating growth of U.S. regulatory framework).
56. See id. (describing impact of booming chemical, plastics, petroleum, auto-
motive, aviation, and munitions industries). The problem was not so much the
number of environmental actions at common law, but rather the difficulty in de-
ciding them. Id. Expert witnesses would often argue for both sides of any case "to
the consternation and confusion of judges and juries," and many cases involved
multistate metropolitan areas "with a crazy quilt of conflicting state laws and local
ordinances." Id.
57. See id. (explaining origins of Environmental Protection Agency).
58. See William D. Ruckelshaus, Environmental Regulation: The Early Days at
EPA, EPA JouRNAL, Mar. 1988, available at http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/
regulate/02.htm (recounting issues underlying passage of Clean Air Act).
59. See Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., CAFE Overview, http://nhtsa.
gov/portal/site/nhtsa/menuitem.43ac99aefa80569eea57529cdba0 4 6a0/ (follow
"CAFE Overview" hyperlink under "Frequently Asked Questions" heading) (last
visited Feb. 28, 2010) [hereinafter CAFE Overview] (relating origin of Energy Pol-
icy and Conservation Act).
60. See generally S. REP. No. 94-516 (1975) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1975
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1956 (offering objectives of Energy Policy and Conservation Act).
2010] 333
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cles is closely related, and both laws play a significant role in the
ongoing debate surrounding preemption. 61
A. Energy Policy and Conservation Act
The EPCA charges the federal Department of Transportation
(DOT) with establishing the maximum feasible average fuel econ-
omy for U.S. automobile manufacturers in a given model year.62
This duty is carried out within the DOT by the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), which sets fuel economy
standards for passenger cars and light trucks using various factors
supplied by statute.63 Accordingly, NHTSA's Corporate Average
Fuel Economy (CAFE) framework allows manufacturers to sell any
combination of vehicles provided that the average fuel economy of
their nationwide fleets meets the applicable mileage standard. 64
CAFE currently requires a fleet average of 27.5 mpg, but Congress
recently increased this standard to thirty-five mpg beginning with
model year 2020.65
An express preemption clause within the EPCA declares:
61. For a further discussion of these statutes and how their objectives are in-
trinsically linked, see infra notes 62-72, 96-104 and accompanying text.
62. See 49 U.S.C. § 32902(a) (2006) (establishing how fuel economy standards
are prescribed). "Fuel economy is defined as the average mileage traveled by an
automobile per gallon of gasoline ... consumed as measured in accordance with
the testing and evaluation protocol set forth by the [EPA]." CAFE Overview, supra
note 59. Basically, the EPA measures exhaust emissions of hydrocarbons, carbon
monoxide, and carbon dioxide per mile traveled and uses a formula known as the
carbon balance equation to calculate the amount of fuel burned per mile driven.
See Raymond B. Ludwiszewski & Charles H. Haake, Cars, Carbon, and Climate
Change, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 665, 687 (2008) (explaining how vehicle fuel economy
is measured).
63. See 49 U.S.C. § 32902(f) (2006) (listing considerations for determining
maximum feasible average fuel economy). The factors that must be considered
are technological feasibility, economic practicability, the effect of other federal
motor vehicle standards on fuel economy, and the country's need to conserve en-
ergy. See id. NHTSA has interpreted economic practicability "to include consider-
ation of consumer choice, economic hardship for the automobile industry, and
vehicle safety." Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth DodgeJeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp.
2d 295, 307 (D. Vt. 2007) (explicating process undertaken by NHTSA to set fuel
economy standards). Light trucks with a gross vehicle weight rating exceeding
8,500 pounds-such as certain pickup trucks, sport utility vehicles, and large
vans-do not have to comply with CAFE standards through model year 2010. See
CAFE Overview, supra note 59 (differentiating types of vehicles subject to CAFE
standards).
64. See Ludwiszewski & Haake, supra note 62, at 682 (explaining CAFE
system).
65. See 49 U.S.C. § 32902(b) (2006) (providing automobile fuel economy av-
erage for model years 2011 through 2020); Energy Independence and Security Act
of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 102, 121 Stat. 1492, 1499 (increasing average fuel
economy beginning with model year 2020).
10
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When an average fuel economy standard prescribed under
this chapter is in effect, a State or a political subdivision of
a State may not adopt or enforce a law or regulation re-
lated to fuel economy standards or average fuel economy
standards for automobiles covered by an average fuel
economy standard under this chapter.66
A savings clause exists, however, which permits a state or politi-
cal subdivision to "prescribe requirements for fuel economy for au-
tomobiles obtained for its own use." 67
B. Clean Air Act
Part of the EPA's mandate under the CAA is to establish emis-
sions standards for new motor vehicles. 6 A preemption clause asso-
ciated with this responsibility provides, in relevant part, that "[n]o
State or any political subdivision thereof shall adopt or attempt to
enforce any standard relating to the control of emissions from new
motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines subject to this part."69
The same section of the CAA also contains two exceptions to this
express preemption clause. 70 First, California is permitted to re-
ceive a waiver from the EPA Administrator if it meets certain qualifi-
cations, and can thereby set its own emissions standards. 71 Second,
other states may adopt California's standards that receive a waiver
from the EPA.7 2
66. 49 U.S.C. § 32919(a) (2006) (promulgating EPCA express preemption
provision).
67. 49 U.S.C. § 32919(c) (2006) (providing exception to EPCA express pre-
emption clause).
68. See 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (a) (2006) (delegating authority to regulate vehicle
emissions to EPA Administrator). The EPA dictates how much pollution new mo-
tor vehicles may emit, but automakers get to decide how to abide by this limitation.
See AUTOMOBILE EMISSIONS, supra note 5, at 3 (discussing EPA emissions standards).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2006) (promulgating CAA express preemption
provision).
70. See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (2006) (offering exceptions to CAA express pre-
emption clause).
71. See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1) (2006) (providing grounds for waiver of pre-
emption). While the statute specifically allows the EPA Administrator to grant a
waiver to any state which adopted emission standards for new vehicles prior to
March 30, 1966, California is the only state that meets this description. See Cent.
Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1156 (E.D. Cal. 2008).
72. See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (3) (2006) (extending possibility of waiver to every
state). If California's standards are granted a waiver of preemption, compliance
with them is treated as compliance with federal standards. Id. At least eleven
states have adopted California's emissions standards since 1994. See Ludwiszewski
& Haake, supra note 62, at 675 (discussing California's special status under CAA).
On March 6, 2008, the EPA generated some controversy by initially denying a
waiver to California's restrictions on greenhouse gas emissions from new automo-
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C. Doctrine of Preemption
The doctrine of preemption is grounded in the Supremacy
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which asserts that the Constitution
and U.S. laws "shall be the supreme Law of the Land," notwith-
standing any contrary state laws or constitutions. 73 Various types of
preemption exist, including express preemption and implied pre-
emption.74 Additionally, implied preemption may be divided into
so-called field preemption and conflict preemption. 75 State and lo-
cal laws may therefore be preempted by "express language in a con-
gressional enactment, by implication from the depth and breadth
of a congressional scheme that occupies the legislative field, or by
implication because of a conflict with a congressional enactment. '76
Congressional intent is the touchstone in every preemption
analysis for determining the scope of a statute with alleged preemp-
tive power.77 Even where Congress has spoken expressly about pre-
emption, a well-established presumption against preemption is
recognized when Congress legislates in a field traditionally occu-
pied by the states.78 Thus, courts start with the assumption that fed-
eral law does not supersede the historic police powers of states
unless that is the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. 79
biles. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, California Greenhouse Gas Waiver Request,
http://www.epa.gov/OMS/climate/ca-waiver.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2010) (re-
lating California's waiver process). With a new Administration in the White
House, however, the EPA ultimately reconsidered its decision and granted a waiver
of preemption on June 30, 2009. Id. California accordingly leads the nation in
vehicle fuel economy and the number of registered alternative-fuel vehicles. See
Michael Grunwald, Why California is Still America's Future, TIME, Oct. 23, 2009,
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1931582,00.html (explaining
how California is at forefront of national energy debate as greenest state in
America).
73. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (rendering state and local laws subordinate to
federal law).
74. See Opinion & Order, Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York, No. 08
Civ. 7837 (PAC), 2008 WL 4866021, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2008) (distinguishing
types of preemption).
75. See id. (characterizing forms of implied preemption).
76. Id. (quoting Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001)) (ex-
plaining multiple ways preemption may apply to state and local laws).
77. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194 (2009) (citing Medtronic, Inc. v.
Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)) (establishing framework for preemption analysis).
78. See id. at 1194-95 (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996))
(describing traditional presumption against preemption).
79. See id. (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)) (defining
presumption against preemption).
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D. Environmental Federalism
Although the Supreme Court's preemption jurisprudence is
often inconsistent and difficult to apply, various cases are relevant
to the preemption provisions within the EPCA and CAA.80 In En-
gine Manufacturers Ass'n v. South Coast Air Quality Management District
(Engine Manufacturers),81 the Court invoked CAA preemption
against rules enacted by a political subdivision of California that
prohibited the purchase or leasing of vehicles which failed to meet
certain emissions requirements.8 2 The Court found that a state law
need not actually interfere with federal law to be considered "re-
lated to" the latter for the purposes of preemption. 3 Even though
the challenged rules had a limited impact on the objectives of the
CAA, the Court also noted that allowing one state or political subdi-
vision to enact such rules would lead to an aggregate effect that
eventually "would undo Congress's carefully calibrated regulatory
scheme." 84
In multiple decisions unrelated to environmental regulation,
the Supreme Court has broadly interpreted the statutory meaning
of the phrase related to.85 Derivations of this phrase are important
because the preemption provisions of the EPCA and CAA apply re-
spectively to regulations "related to fuel economy standards" and
"relating to the control of emissions." 86 In Travelers Indemnity Co. v.
Bailey (Bailey),87 for example, the Court expressed that the phrase
"in relation to" is expansive when used in a statute. 88 The Court
80. See Alexandra B. Klass, State Innovation And Preemption: Lessons From State
Climate Change Efforts, 41 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1653, 1658 (2008) (criticizing Supreme
Court precedents involving preemption).
81. 541 U.S. 246 (2004).
82. Id. at 258-59 (invoking CAA preemption against rules established by entity
responsible for air pollution control in Los Angeles metropolitan area). The
Court held that the challenged rules set "standards" within the meaning of the
CAA express preemption clause even though the rules regulated the purchase of
new vehicles rather than vehicle sales. Id. at 253-55.
83. See id. at 255 (clarifying meaning of "related to" in any preemption
clause).
84. Id. (offering rationale for applying CAA preemption).
85. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 237 (1993) (portraying phrase
"in relation to" as expansive); New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield
Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 653 (1995) (construing phrase "relate to" as
having a connection with or making reference to).
86. See 49 U.S.C. § 32919(a) (2006) (promulgating EPCA express preemption
provision); 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2006) (promulgating CAA express preemption
provision).
87. 129 S. Ct. 2195 (2009).
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further demonstrated in New York State Conference of Blue Cross &
Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.89 that understanding re-
lated to requires comparing the objectives of the supposedly pre-
emptive federal statute with the purpose and effects of the
challenged state or local law.90
There are no precedents in which fuel economy standards
were directly challenged on the basis of EPCA and CAA preemp-
tion, but two 2007 cases discuss this issue incidentally: Green Moun-
tain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie (Crombie)9 1 and Central
Valley Chysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene (Goldstene)92 In these cases, auto-
mobile manufacturers filed essentially identical lawsuits challenging
California's stringent emissions standards for new vehicles.93 Both
federal district courts held that these standards would be valid if
and when the EPA granted a waiver of preemption under the
CAA.94 Regarding the applicability of a presumption against pre-
emption, the court in Crombie determined that the regulation of ve-
hicle emissions cannot be categorized as either a traditional area of
state regulation or an area in which federal control is
predominate. 95
Another notable conclusion in these cases was the lack of in-
herent conflict between the EPA's authority under the CAA and
89. 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
90. See id. at 656-59 (exhibiting process for interpreting "related to" language
in preemption clause).
91. 508 F. Supp. 2d 295 (D. Vt. 2007).
92. 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (E.D. Cal. 2007).
93. See Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d
295, 300-01 (D. Vt. 2007) (discussing initiation of case); Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep,
Inc. v. Goldstene 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1154-55 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (providing proce-
dural history). Vermont adopted California's regulations in anticipation of the
latter receiving a waiver of CAA preemption. See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (3) (2006)
(extending possibility of waiver to states complying with California's standards pre-
viously granted a waiver).
94. See Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 397 (expressing that CAA preemption is
not applicable if EPA grants waiver to California's emissions standards); Goldstene,
529 F. Supp. 2d at 1189 (concluding that California regulations become immune
from preemption once granted waiver of preemption). The decisions in these
twin cases take on new meaning considering that the EPA recently granted the
waiver sought by California. For a discussion of the controversy involving this
waiver application, see supra note 72.
95. See Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 350-51 (comparing regulation of vehicle
emissions to other regulatory areas in which state or federal control clearly domi-
nates). Since the beginning of federal involvement in this area, the regulation of
environmental pollution has been regarded as a cooperative legislative effort, char-
acterized by overlapping spheres of state and federal authority. See id.
14
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NHTSA's authority under the EPCA.96 While the CAA does not
mention vehicle fuel economy, emissions standards essentially
double as mileage standards because the only way to reduce a vehi-
cle's carbon emissions is to improve its fuel economy.97 When state
or local regulations specifically target vehicle emissions-by man-
dating the sale of "zero-emission vehicles," for example-courts
have had no difficulty finding such regulations preempted by the
CAA.9 8 The preemption analysis becomes more complicated when
regulations target vehicle mileage standards but remain silent on
emissions. 99
The court in Crombie also found that Congress's undoubted in-
tent with the EPCA's express preemption clause "was to make the
setting of fuel economy standards exclusively a federal concern
.... "100 Yet, Crombie and Goldstene both demonstrate that regula-
tions preempted by the EPCA are not necessarily preempted by the
CAA. 10 1 Despite the scientific overlap between these two types of
regulations, certain courts will not find mileage standards pre-
empted by the CAA unless one of their stated objectives is address-
96. See id. at 350 (concluding that preemption doctrines do not apply to inter-
play between CAA and EPCA); Goldstene 529 F. Supp. 2d at 1169-70 (observing that
conflict is possible but not inevitable between purposes of CAA and EPCA).
97. See Ludwiszewski & Haake, supra note 62, at 667 (explaining how carbon
dioxide emissions are direct function of burning fossil fuels). "Improving fuel
economy so that vehicles burn less gasoline is the only known practical way for a
manufacturer of today's gasoline-powered automobiles to reduce tailpipe emis-
sions of CO 2." Id. at 687. See supra note 62 for an explanation of how fuel econ-
omy is measured, which underscores the link between fuel economy and vehicle
emissions.
98. See, e.g., Ass'n of Int'l Auto. Mfrs., Inc. v. Comm'r, Mass. Dept. of Envtl. Prot.,
208 F.3d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding zero-emission vehicle mandates are stan-
dards relating to control of emissions within meaning of CAA preemption clause);
Am. Auto. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Cahill, 152 F.3d 196, 199-200 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding re-
quirement that zero-emission vehicles comprise certain percentage of new light-
duty-vehicles to be preempted by CAA). Even though the challenged regulations
in Cahill did not impose a precise limit on emissions, the Second Circuit expressed
that there were sufficient grounds for preemption because the requirement had
.no purpose other than to effect a general reduction in emissions" and was "in the
nature of a command having a direct effect on the level of emissions." Cahill, 152
F.3d at 200.
99. See, e.g., Opinion & Order, Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York,
No. 08 Civ. 7837 (PAC), 2008 WL 4866021, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2008) (find-
ing CAA preemption unlikely based on purpose of rules despite their potential
effect).
100. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 354 (describing Congressional intent behind
EPCA preemption clause).
101. See id. at 353 (asserting that emissions regulations are not equivalent to
fuel economy standards when compliance is not achieved solely through improv-
ing fuel efficiency); Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 1176 (rejecting notion that emis-
sions regulation requiring substantial improvement in mileage standards
constitutes defacto regulation of fuel economy without one-to-one correlation).
2010]
15
Liebeskind: It's Not Easy Green: Metropolitan Taxicab Reveals Hurdles Posed b
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2010
340 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JoumRAL [Vol. XXI: p. 325
ing vehicle emissions.10 2 As the Supreme Court concluded in
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 10 3 a landmark deci-
sion solidifying the authority of the EPA to regulate greenhouse
gases, inconsistency between the EPA's obligations under the CAA
and the DOT's obligations under the EPCA is not inevitable. 10 4
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
In Metropolitan Taxicab, the District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York found the TLC's Lease Cap Rules to be a de facto
mandate on taxicab owners to purchase hybrids and held that this
mandate is preempted by the EPCA and CAA because it relates to
both fuel economy and emissions standards.10 5 Before embarking
on its analysis, the court acknowledged that no one questions the
desirability of fuel-efficient vehicles or the ability of New York City
to incentivize the purchase of certain types of taxicabs.10 6 Instead,
the narrow issue in this case was whether the TLC's regulations in-
terfered with Congressional intent to preserve exclusive jurisdiction
over the regulation of fuel economy and vehicle emissions. 10 7
A. De Facto Mandate Determination
To resolve this question, the court first sought to determine if
the Lease Cap Rules mandated the purchase of hybrid taxicabs.108
102. See, e.g., Opinion & Order, Metro. Taxicab Opinion, 2008 WL 4866021, at
*14 (finding CAA preemption not applicable to rules that are silent on emissions
even if emissions reduction is likely result).
103. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
104. See id. at 532 (discussing relationship between responsibilities of EPA and
DOT). A certain amount of consistency can actually be expected given the similar-
ity in the factors that the EPA and NHTSA must consider when setting their re-
spective standards. See Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 1169.
105. See Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York, 633 F. Supp. 2d 83, 105-
06 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (granting preliminary injunction against Lease Cap Rules).
This holding marked a slight retreat from the court's prior decision regarding the
TLC's 25/30 Rules, which were deemed to be preempted by the EPCA but not the
CAA. See Metro. Taxicab, 2008 WL 4866021, at *14-15.
106. See Metro. Taxicab, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 87 (clarifying parameters of case).
There were no legal challenges to incentives such as the city issuing new taxicab
medallions exclusively for hybrid vehicles, extending the life of hybrid taxicabs
from three to five years, or increasing the maximum lease rate for hybrid taxicabs
by $3 per shift. See id. Furthermore, the court expressed that "[i]ncreasing the
number of hybrid taxicabs is an appropriate and important government priority."
Id.
107. See id. (elucidating case's narrow issue). Because the plaintiffs moved for
a preliminary injunction against the Lease Cap Rules, the court could grant this
motion only upon a showing of irreparable harm and demonstration of a likeli-
hood of success on the merits. See id. at 92.
108. See id. at 87 (describing first step in court's preemption analysis).
16
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Due to the lack of controlling cases, the parties drew comparisons
to preemption cases involving the federal Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).109 From these cases, the court
concluded that
a local law is preempted if it directly regulates within a
field preempted by Congress, or if it indirectly regulates
within a preempted field in such a way that effectively
mandates a specific, preempted outcome .... Conversely,
a local law is not preempted when it only indirectly regu-
lates parties within a preempted field and presents regu-
lated parties with viable, non-preempted options. 110
Although the ERISA cases provided a framework for analyzing
the interplay between a de facto mandate and preemption, they
failed to reveal how to determine whether particular economic in-
centives established a mandate. 1 ' Hence, the court asked the par-
ties to present expert evidence on the consequences of the Lease
Cap Rules.1 12
Ultimately, the plaintiffs' evidence convinced the court that
the profit disparity between owning a Crown Victoria taxicab and
owning a hybrid taxicab would become so great that no rational
owner would choose the former. 113 The court concluded that the
Lease Cap Rules presented an offer which realistically could not be
refused, thereby rejecting the defendants' argument that the rules
were not a mandate as long as owners of conventional taxicabs con-
tinued to earn any profit. 114 This conclusion was bolstered by the
109. See id. at 93 (relating how parties resorted to ERISA preemption cases
due to lack of cases on point).
110. Id. at 95-96 (synthesizing rule from various ERISA cases with differing
outcomes). The cases relied on by the court were New York State Conference of Blue
Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995); California Div. of
Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., 519 U.S. 316 (1997); Retail Indus.
Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007); and Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n
v. Suffolk County, 497 F. Supp. 2d 403 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
111. See Metro. Taxicab, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 96 (explaining that ERISA cases
alone are insufficient to make determination about Lease Cap Rules).
112. See id. (suggesting need for particular evidence to complete preemption
analysis).
113. See id. at 97 (discussing evidence presented by both parties regarding
impact of Lease Cap Rules). The plaintiffs' expert economist estimated that, by
2011, annual profits from owning a Crown Victoria taxicab would be reduced to
$581 while profits from owning a hybrid taxicab would reach $7,099. See id. at 96.
114. See id. at 97-99 (rebuffing claims by defendants' expert in favor of those
made by plaintiffs' expert). The taxicab industry is profit-oriented, according to
the court, and therefore fleet owners will always take a larger profit over a smaller
one. See id. at 100.
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fact that the Lease Cap Rules were expressly adopted to encourage
the purchase of hybrids. 1 5 Consequently, the court held that the
TLC's rules effectively mandated the purchase of hybrids by provid-
ing no viable alternatives to taxicab owners."l 6
B. EPCA Preemption
Once the court deemed the Lease Cap Rules a mandate, it
turned its attention to whether they were related to fuel economy
or emissions standards so as to be preempted by the EPCA or
CAA. 1 7 The defendants tried to distinguish the Lease Cap Rules
from the TLC's previous 25/30 Rules, which they admitted were
preempted under the EPCA, by arguing that the new rules simply
required hybrid taxicabs without requiring vehicles of a certain
mpg rating.11 8 The court rejected this narrow construction of re-
lated to, however, in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's broad inter-
pretation of that phrase in Bailey.119 Regardless of whether the
Lease Cap Rules mentioned specific mileage standards, the district
court explained, they effectively forced taxicab owners to meet a
certain mpg threshold set by the fuel economy of TLC-approved
hybrid or clean diesel vehicles. 120
In addition to the effect of the Lease Cap Rules, the court
looked to the purpose of the regulation to determine if preemption
was justified. 12 Based on the statements of New York City officials,
it was clear that the rules were intended to address fuel effi-
ciency. 122 The court asserted that "creative drafting and the ab-
sence of specific reference to mileage do not make the effect-or
the purpose-of the Lease Cap Rules any different than the prior
115. See id. at 96 (noting justification for implementing rules). For statements
made by New York City officials that reveal the objectives of the Lease Cap Rules,
see supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
116. See Metro. Taxicab, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 100 (holding Lease Cap Rules to be
defacto mandate to purchase hybrids).
117. See id. at 87 (discussing next step in preemption analysis).
118. See id. at 101-02 (reiterating arguments made by New York City in favor
of Lease Cap Rules).
119. See id. at 102 (rejecting defendants' proposed interpretation of "related
to").
120. See id. (emphasizing practical consequences of Lease Cap Rules).
121. See Metro. Taxicab, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 102 (bolstering conclusion about
effect of rules with their ostensible purpose).
122. See id. at 102-03 (drawing inference from statements made by proponents
of Lease Cap Rules). In announcing the Lease Cap Rules, for example, the TLC
Commissioner stated, "Our goal from the beginning was to get fuel efficient taxis on
the road using whatever appropriate methods required.. . ." Id.
18
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preempted [25/30 Rules]. '"123 Sidestepping the question of how
the EPCA holds up in light of a presumption against preemption,
the court simply noted that the express language of the EPCA's pre-
emption clause and recent conduct by the federal government led
to the sole conclusion that fuel economy standards are a federal
matter. 124 Thus, the EPCA preempted the Lease Cap Rules because
they related to fuel economy standards in violation of the federal
government's exclusive jurisdiction. 125
C. CAA Preemption
Turning to the CAA, the court set out to determine if the
Lease Cap Rules also related to the control of vehicle emissions.' 2 6
First, the court reexamined the purpose of these rules and distin-
guished them from the TLC's abandoned 25/30 Rules. 127 Unlike
the 25/30 Rules, which the court previously held did not relate to
emissions standards because they were silent on emissions, one of
the stated purposes of the Lease Cap Rules was to incentivize the
purchase of "cleaner vehicles."1 28 Relying on the Supreme Court's
interpretation of "alternative-fuel vehicles" in Engine Manufacturers
and the definition of "hybrid vehicle" within the Lease Cap Rules,
the district court remarked that it is a matter of common sense that
cleaner vehicles refers to the control of emissions.' 29
In terms of the emissions-related effect of the Lease Cap Rules,
the court observed that their impact on nationwide regulation and
123. Id. at 103 (criticizing New York City's attempt to pass off preempted rules
under misleading guise).
124. See id. (asserting exclusive federal jurisdiction over fuel economy stan-
dards). The court pointed to a May 2009 proposal by President Barack Obama,
which suggested that new CAFE standards require a fleet average of 35.5 mpg by
2016, to demonstrate that the federal government is actively involved in the regula-
tion of fuel economy. See id. at 101.
125. See id. at 103 (finding Lease Cap Rules preempted by EPCA).
126. See Metro. Taxicab, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 103 (repeating preemption analysis
with CAA).
127. See id. at 104 (comparing Lease Cap Rules to 25/30 Rules).
128. See id. (highlighting differences in language of old rules and new rules).
129. See id. at 104-05 (surmising true meaning of plain language in Lease Cap
Rules). The court explained how it was assumed in Engine Manufactures that regu-
lations requiring "alternative-fuel vehicles" related to the control of emissions sim-
ply because the term was defined as vehicles not powered by gasoline or diesel. See
id. at 105. Under the Lease Cap Rules, a "hybrid vehicle" was defined as a "com-
mercially available mass production vehicle originally equipped by the manufactur-
ers with a combustion engine system together with an electric propulsion system
that operates in an integrated manner." Id. The court deemed these definitions
sufficiently similar not to require expert testimony to demonstrate the close con-
nection between hybrids and vehicle emissions. See id.
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vehicle production would be minimal. 130 Nevertheless, in light of
the rationale for preemption promulgated by Engine Manufacturers,
the court could not allow such minor intrusions to stand because of
the harmful snowball effect they could create. 131 Much like how
the Lease Cap Rules were related to fuel economy despite their fail-
ure to impose a specific mpg requirement, the court found the
rules to also be related to vehicle emissions despite the absence of a
precise limit on emissions.1 32 Regardless of the rules' overt lan-
guage, it was sufficient in the eyes of the court that the rules at-
tempted to have a general effect of reducing taxicab emissions. 133
Thus, the CAA also preempted the Lease Cap Rules because their
purpose and effect related to the control of vehicle emissions. 34
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
A. Alternative Routes to Environmental Federalism
In the area of environmental regulation, the issue of preemp-
tion often arises because different levels of government rarely limit
themselves to what legal scholars have deemed to be their appropri-
ate domains. 13 5 Some commentators argue that states have been at
the forefront of environmental policy for decades, but their leader-
ship and experimentation are being threatened by expanding regu-
latory ceilings imposed via federal preemption. 3 6 Although every
130. See id. (evaluating consequences of Lease Cap Rules in terms of vehicle
emissions).
131. See Metro. Taxicab, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 105 (applying Supreme Court's
reasoning to facts of this case). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's justifica-
tion for CAA preemption in Engine Manufacturers, see supra notes 82-84 and accom-
panying text.
132. See Metro. Taxicab, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 105 (conferring more weight to
practical effect of rules rather than their explicit terms).
133. See id. (relying on reasoning of Second Circuit in Cahill). For a discus-
sion of the Second Circuit's analysis in Cahill see supra note 98.
134. See Metro. Taxicab, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 105 (finding Lease Cap Rules pre-
empted by CAA).
135. See David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case
Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REv. 1796, 1796
(2008) (describing incidence of preemption cases related to environmental
regulation).
136. See, e.g., Brian T. Burgess, Note, Limiting Preemption in Environmental Law:
An Analysis of the Cost-Externalization Argument and California Assembly Bill 1493, 84
N.Y.U. L. REv. 258, 258 (2009) (criticizing increased occurrence of federal pre-
emption). Federal laws that establish minimum environmental standards and pre-
clude less stringent state measures create "federal floors," while federal laws that
prevent more protective state regulations establish "federal ceilings." See id. at 259.
"Federal ceiling preemption has expanded in environmental law as the result of
broad interpretations of existing statutes by courts and agencies as well as the en-
actment of new legislation by Congress expressly displacing state regulatory au-
20
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state took some action to address climate change by 2006, for exam-
ple, the federal government has failed to follow suit in the face of
intense lobbying by industry groups to broaden the preemptive
force of existing environmental laws. 137
Other commentators support federal preemption on the
grounds that uniform, centralized regulation is easier on American
industries and more appropriate for tackling major environmental
challenges. 138 A middle ground approach advocates combined
roles for local, state, and federal governments in environmental
regulation because of the strengths each brings to the table. 13 9 The
benefits of overlapping jurisdictions include the ability of the fed-
eral government to speed the adoption of innovative policies devel-
oped by states, which have long been considered "laboratories of
democracy" with a valuable diversity of experience and
knowledge. 140
B. Metropolitan Taxicab Decision Passes Inspection
Regardless of one's personal views on environmental federal-
ism, there is little doubt that Metropolitan Taxicab properly applied
existing law to find the TLC's latest regulations preempted by the
EPCA and CAA. 141 Few cases previously touched upon EPCA pre-
emption of local mileage regulations, but the Lease Cap Rules were
clearly related to fuel economy standards given the U.S. Supreme
Court's broad interpretation of related to.1 42 As two legal commen-
thority." Id. at 266. In general, both federal ceilings and floors prevent states from
tailoring regulations to their unique preferences and local conditions. See id. at
271.
137. See id. at 262, 268 (offering instance of states taking lead in environmen-
tal regulation where federal government has not acted).
138. See, e.g., Ludwiszewski & Haake, supra note 62, at 667 (touting federal
environmental regulation of global climate change over state regulation). Because
greenhouse gas emissions disperse throughout the atmosphere and cannot be con-
tained within the jurisdiction where they are produced, for example, independent
state regulations would have little impact on the overall problem of global warm-
ing. See id. at 679. Those in favor of preemption also argue that it is more efficient
for businesses like automobile manufacturers to meet uniform federal standards
rather than fifty different state standards. See id. at 682.
139. See, e.g., Adelman & Engel, supra note 135, at 1831-33 (advocating dy-
namic system of concurrent jurisdiction for environmental regulation).
140. See id. at 1824-25, 1847-48 (discussing advantages to joint regulatory in-
volvement by states and federal government). On more than one occasion, a new
environmental standard established by California was subsequently adopted by the
EPA as a national standard. Id. at 1840.
141. For a discussion of the district court's application of existing law, see
supra notes 117-34 and accompanying text.
142. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the phrase
.related to," see supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
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tators observed, "Longstanding Supreme Court precedents support
the breadth and inviolability of the EPCA's express preemption
provision. The Supreme Court has consistently held that preemp-
tion provisions 'related to' a particular field 'express a broad pre-
emptive purpose' and are 'clearly expansive.'",,43
The EPCA's legislative history, although somewhat lacking,
lends support to a broad interpretation of its express preemption
clause. 144 The intended scope of this clause is never directly dis-
cussed, but Congress's rejection of more limited forms of preemp-
tion indicates that it intended the EPCA to broadly preempt all
nonfederal regulation of fuel economy.' 45 The original Senate bill
would only have preempted laws "inconsistent" with federal fuel
economy standards, while the original bill from the House of Rep-
resentatives would have merely preempted those laws not "identical
to" federal requirements.1 46 Therefore, because Congress would
have used different language if it intended the EPCA to have nar-
row preemptive power, a broad interpretation of the preemption
clause as enacted is appropriate.' 47
The district court also adeptly found that the Lease Cap Rules
did not need to specifically include mileage standards to be pre-
empted by the EPCA.148 As the court in Goldstene noted, "The nar-
rowest interpretation consistent with the plain language of [the]
EPCA's preemptive provision is that it encompasses only those state
regulations that are explicitly aimed at the establishment of fuel
economy standards, or that are the de facto equivalent of mileage
regulation .... ,,149 Not only did the financial mechanisms imposed
143. Ludwiszewski & Haake, supra note 62, at 689 (citing Morales v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383-84 (1992); Egelhoff v. Egelhoff 532 U.S. 141,
146-47 (2001)) (summarizing Supreme Court's position on phrase related to in
connection with preemption cases).
144. See id. (evaluating legislative history of EPCA).
145. Id. (drawing inferences from legislative process culminating in EPCA).
146. See S. REP. No. 94-179, at 25 (1975); H.R. REP. No. 94-340, at 274 (1975)
(§ 507 as introduced, § 509 as reported) (revealing language in proposed EPCA
preemption provisions).
147. See Ophirv. City of Boston, 647 F. Supp. 2d 86, 94 (D. Mass. 2009) (discuss-
ing legislative history of EPCA). One likely reason why Congress rejected a nar-
rower preemption clause was that it did not want to restrict consumers' purchase
options or cause adverse economic consequences to the automotive industry, both
concerns embodied in the existing statutory language. See 49 U.S.C. § 32902(f)
(2006) (listing factors that must be considered when setting maximum feasible
average fuel economy).
148. For a discussion of the district court's determination that the practical
consequences of the Lease Cap Rules outweigh the lack of overt mileage standards,
see supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
149. Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1175 (E.D.
Cal. 2008) (describing two circumstances when EPCA preemption may apply).
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by the Lease Cap Rules revolve around the inherent difference in
fuel economy between conventional and hybrid taxicabs, but New
York City officials made it clear that the rules were targeted at im-
proving the taxicab fleet's fuel efficiency.150 Thus, EPCA preemp-
tion of the Lease Cap Rules was appropriate because they were
unmistakably related to fuel economy standards. 51
While local regulations preempted by the EPCA are not neces-
sarily preempted by the CAA, the court in Metropolitan Taxicab cor-
rectly held that the Lease Cap Rules were preempted by both. 152
Some have criticized the district court's 2008 ruling that found the
25/30 Rules preempted by the EPCA as misguided. 153 Yet, that de-
cision was arguably generous to New York City in holding that CAA
preemption did not apply when the TLC's rules were silent on
emissions.' 54 Notwithstanding the holdings in Crombie and Gold-
stene, fuel economy standards are scientifically tantamount to vehi-
cle emissions standards. 155 It follows logically that local regulations
ostensibly related to fuel economy are also related to vehicle emis-
sions. 156 Accordingly, the court properly found that the CAA pre-
empted the Lease Cap Rules even though they too failed to
specifically reference emissions standards. 157
150. For a discussion of the Lease Cap Rules' connection to fuel economy, see
supra notes 36, 42-47 and accompanying text.
151. For a discussion of the district court's ruling concerning EPCA preemp-
tion, see supra notes 117-25 and accompanying text.
152. For a discussion of the district court's ruling concerning CAA preemp-
tion, see supra notes 126-34 and accompanying text.
153. See Recent Case, Southern District of New York Holds that New York City Hy-
brid Taxi Regulations are Likely Preempted by the EPCA - Metropolitan Taxicab Board of
Trade v. City of New York, No. 08 Civ. 7837 (PAC), 2008 WL 4866021 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
31, 2008), 122 HARv. L. REv. 2275, 2279-80 (2009) (arguing that court should have
interpreted "use" broadly in EPCA savings clause). This article claims that the 25/
30 Rules were related to fuel economy but should have been exempt from preemp-
tion because the taxicabs subject to the rules were obtained for New York City's
"own use." See id. at 2279.
154. See Opinion & Order, Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York, No.
08 Civ. 7837 (PAC), 2008 WL 4866021, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2008) (rejecting
CAA preemption because 25/30 Rules did not specifically say anything about
emissions).
155. For a discussion of the scientific link between fuel economy and vehicle
emissions standards, see supra note 97 and accompanying text.
156. See id. (supporting conclusion that vehicle emissions regulations are ef-
fectively fuel economy regulations).
157. For a discussion of the district court's holding regarding CAA preemp-
tion, see supra notes 126-34 and accompanying text.
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C. A Minor Speed Bump in the District Court's Analysis
One point that the court could have addressed more fully, al-
though it would not have changed the outcome of the case, is the
traditional presumption against preemption. 158 Given Crombie's as-
sessment that the regulation of vehicle emissions is not exclusively
an area of federal concern, courts seemingly cannot assert CAA or
EPCA preemption without explaining why such legislation does not
fall into a field traditionally occupied by the states. 159 Rather than
dodge the issue, the court in Metropolitan Taxicab could have dis-
cussed how there has been a significant federal presence in the reg-
ulation of fuel economy and vehicle emissions for decades even
though taxicab regulation is traditionally a local matter.160 In addi-
tion, the court could have pointed to prior decisions where these
types of regulations were deemed to be of federal concern. 161
VI. IMPACT
Considering the lack of case law addressing federal preemp-
tion of local fuel economy standards, Metropolitan Taxicab will likely
have a significant impact on environmental law pertaining to vehi-
cles.1 62 This notion is bolstered by the fact that this case influenced
decisions in two other jurisdictions within barely three months of
being decided.163 First, the District Court for the District of Massa-
chusetts relied heavily on Metropolitan Taxicab to strike down a Bos-
ton ordinance that effectively mandated an all-hybrid taxicab fleet
158. For a discussion of the court's half-hearted approach to the presumption
against preemption, see supra note 124 and accompanying text.
159. For a discussion of the traditional presumption against preemption and
the relevant holding in Crombie, see supra notes 78-79, 95 and accompanying text.
160. See Ophirv. City of Boston, 647 F. Supp. 2d 86, 91-92 (D. Mass. 2009) (dem-
onstrating better way of addressing presumption against preemption). The pre-
sumption against preemption "is not triggered when a state regulates in an area
'where there has been a history of significant federal presence.'" Id. at 91 (quoting
United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000)).
161. See, e.g., Green Mountain Chysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F.
Supp. 2d 295, 354 (D. Vt. 2007) (describing Congress' intent with EPCA preemp-
tion clause). The fact that the EPCA and CAA both include broad express pre-
emption clauses supports the notion that it was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress to supersede the historic police powers of the state in these environmen-
tal areas. For the elements of the presumption against preemption, see supra notes
78-79 and accompanying text.
162. For a discussion of the lack of cases on point, see supra note 109 and
accompanying text.
163. See, e.g., Ophir, 647 F. Supp. 2d 86 (finding city ordinance likely pre-
empted by EPCA); Green Alliance Taxi Cab Ass'n v. King County, No. C08-1048RAJ,
2009 WL 3185745 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2009) (permitting plaintiffs to amend
complaint to include EPCA preemption claim).
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by 2015.164 Subsequently, the District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Washington used Metropolitan Taxicab to justify allowing two
taxicab associations to amend their complaint against the local gov-
ernment and include an additional claim of federal preemption
under the EPCA. 1 65
Following Metropolitan Taxicab, it will be nearly impossible for
cities and states to mandate the use of hybrids unless one of the
narrow exceptions to the EPCA and CAA preemption clauses is
met.' 66 Nevertheless, increasing social pressure and market reali-
ties make it likely that taxicab owners, as well as drivers among the
general population, will voluntarily transition to more fuel-efficient
vehicles. 167 As one environmentalist noted, "Every other industry
has faced the need to retool in light of technological innovations,
164. See Ophir, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 87-88 (providing facts of case). Boston Po-
lice Department Rule 403 required that every vehicle used as a taxicab as of August
29, 2008, "be a new Clean Taxi vehicle or must have been purchased before August
29, 2008." Id. As defined in the rule, only hybrid vehicles approved by the Hack-
ney Carriage Unit of the Boston Police Department qualified as a "Clean Taxi." See
id. While Rule 403 did not explicitly require a minimum fuel economy, the court
found 403's requirement to be more stringent than that of the Lease Cap Rules
and thus preempted by the EPCA. See id. at 91, 94. Hailing Metropolitan Taxicab as
persuasive and well-reasoned, the Ophir court cautioned that Boston "has a long
row to hoe." Id. at 91.
165. See Green Alliance, 2009 WL 3185745, at *5-6 (describing rationale for al-
lowing amended complaint). The plaintiffs originally sued King County and the
City of Seattle to challenge a new county rule establishing requirements that taxi-
cab associations must satisfy to participate in a test project and receive additional
taxicab licenses. See id. at *1. Although the court granted the defendants' motion
for summary judgment, it found that a new claim under the EPCA would not be
futile in light of Metropolitan Taxicab. See id. at *6. In particular, the plaintiffs ar-
gued that the county rule was preempted by the EPCA because one of its require-
ments is that the selected associations agree to purchase hybrid vehicles. See id. at
*5.
166. For a discussion of the preemption provisions and related exceptions
within the EPCA and CAA, see supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text. In addi-
tion to the exceptions provided in these statutes, "[a]ctions taken by a state or
political subdivision may not be preempted in some circumstances where the state
acts as a market participant, rather than as a market regulator." Metro. Taxicab
Opinion, 2008 WL 4866021, at *7 (citing Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated
Builders & Contractors, Inc., 507 U.S. 210, 227 (1993)). It is difficult to qualify for
the market participant doctrine, however, because governments act much more
frequently as regulators than as industry participants. See id. at *10-11.
167. SeeJonathan Saltzman, Hybrid Mandate for Taxis Reversed, BOSTON GLOBE,
Aug. 15, 2009, http://www.boston.com/lifestyle/green/articles/2009/08/15/hy-
bridmandate for taxisreversed/ (suggesting market realities will ultimately re-
sult in more hybrid taxicabs); Richard Stengel, For American Consumers, a
Responsibility Revolution, TIME, Sept. 10, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/nation/
arficle/0,8599,1921444,00.html (describing rise of ethical consumerism in U.S.).
Perhaps due to differences in local culture, the introduction of hybrid taxicabs has
gone more smoothly in cities such as San Francisco and Denver than in New York
and Boston. See Kate Galbraith, Boston, Other Cities Debate Hybrid Taxis, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 1, 2009, http://greeninc.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/04/01 /boston-other-cities-
20101
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and so must the taxi industry."'168 By the time Metropolitan Taxicab
was decided, hybrids accounted for approximately sixteen percent
of New York City's taxicab fleet, some 2,060 taxicabs. 169 This num-
ber marked a nearly thirty-seven percent increase in the number of
hybrid taxicabs in the city in just six months. 170 Regardless of ex-
isting fuel economy and emissions standards, it appears that the dis-
mal state of the economy and dramatic fluctuations in the cost of
gasoline have caused a natural market shift toward vehicles with
better fuel economy and lower emissions.171
Although federal inaction on major environmental issues cre-
ated a regulatory void that many cities and states have attempted to
fill, Metropolitan Taxicab reveals the hurdles facing state and local
initiatives. 172 In terms of improving vehicle fuel economy and emis-
sions, cities and states may have to wait for results to materialize
from the Energy Policy and Security Act of 2007173 or President
Barack Obama's proposed new policy on national fuel efficiency. 174
debate-hybrid-taxis/ (comparing opposition by taxicab industry to hybrid require-
ments in New York City and Boston).
168. George Bachrach, The Greening of Boston's Taxi Fleet, BOSTON GLOBE, July
12, 2008, http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial-opinion/oped/articles/
2008/07/12/thegreening-ofbostons taxi fleet/ (advocating reasons why Bos-
ton taxicab owners should embrace buying hybrids).
169. See Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York, 633 F. Supp. 2d 83, 89
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (offering statistics regarding number of hybrid taxicabs in New
York City).
170. For a discussion of the number of hybrid taxicabs in New York City at the
time of the district court's 2008 decision, see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
171. See Burgess, supra note 136, at 295 (discussing natural market shift to-
ward hybrid vehicles).
172. See Klass, supra note 80, at 1682 (describing policy void created by EPA's
failure to even attempt limiting greenhouse gas emissions). When the federal gov-
ernment failed to curb greenhouse gas emissions, various northeastern and mid-
Atlantic states banded together to establish a cap-and-trade system to reduce power
plant emissions. See Dean Scott, Legislation: Governors Urge Congress to Set Carbon Cap
but Want to Protect States from Preemption, ENV'T REP., (BNA) No. 38 ER 2452 (Nov.
16, 2007) (explaining creation of Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative). Numerous
western states likewise launched an initiative to curb greenhouse gas emissions in
their region of the country. See id. (relating formation of Western Climate
Initiative).
173. See Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140,
§ 102, 121 Stat. 1492, 1499 (2007) (increasing average fuel economy beginning
with model year 2020). Congress passed this legislation to reduce America's de-
pendence on oil by increasing CAFE standards on new cars and trucks to thirty-five
mpg by model year 2020. See FuelEconomy.gov, Reduce Oil Dependence Costs,
http://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/oildep.shtml (last visited Feb. 28, 2010)
(describing justification and projected effect of Energy Independence and Secur-
ity Act of 2007). It is estimated that this change could reduce U.S. petroleum
consumption by twenty-five billion gallons by 2030. Id.
174. For a discussion of President Obama's proposal to raise fuel economy
standards, see supra note 124.
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Should cities and states not wish to merely sit in traffic, however, an
alternative route might entail creating incentives to encourage the
use of hybrid vehicles. 175 In order to increase the number of fuel-
efficient taxicabs in particular, governments may release additional
taxicab licenses exclusively to hybrids or offer financial rewards for
switching to hybrids. 176 The validity of such policies is dubious fol-
lowing Metropolitan Taxicab, but the taxicab industry appears less in-
clined to mount a legal challenge when the government
encourages green behavior using carrots rather than sticks. 177
The Bloomberg administration has already appealed the Metro-
politan Taxicab decision to the Second Circuit, but reversal is un-
likely unless existing federal law is amended or replaced.178 Critics
argue that the EPCA and CAA preemption provisions and savings
clauses, largely unchanged since the 1970s, are outdated because
Congress did not contemplate many of today's environmental is-
175. For examples of incentives used by New York City to promote the use of
hybrid taxicabs, see supra note 106. Even President Obama seems to be getting
impatient with Congress's failure to pass comprehensive environmental legislation.
See John M. Broder, E.P.A. Moves to Curtail Greenhouse Gas Emissions, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 30, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/01/science/earth/Olepa.html
(detailing Obama Administration moving forward with new rules to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions from power plants and large industrial facilities). In
August 2009, the Obama Administration awarded more than $2 billion in grants
from the economic stimulus package to give the U.S. a leg up in the production of
fuel-efficient vehicles. See Matthew L. Wald, $2 Billion in Grants to Bolster U.S. Manu-
facturing of Parts for Electric Vehicles, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2009, http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/08/06/business/06battery.html (providing recipients
and objectives of grants geared toward nascent electric car industry). The Obama
Administration also paved the way for greater EPA regulation of emissions from
vehicles and other sources by issuing an "endangerment finding" in December
2009 regarding carbon dioxide and five other greenhouse gases. See H. Josef Her-
bert & Dina Cappiello, Historic EPA Finding: Greenhouse Gases Harm Humans, ABC
NEWS, Dec. 7, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=9268865 (re-
lating EPA announcement that man-made greenhouse gases should be reduced
because they threaten public health and welfare).
176. For examples of hybrid incentives that have been embraced by the taxi-
cab industry, see supra note 106.
177. For further discussion demonstrating the attractiveness of incentives and
disincentives, see supra note 106.
178. See Posting of Amy Garber to Global Climate Law Blog, http://
www.globalclimatelaw.com/2009/07/articles/climate-change-litigation/new-york-
city-hybrid-taxi-plan-winding-its-way-through-court/ (July 21, 2009) (discussing Met-
ropolitan Taxicab decision and subsequent appeal by New York City). Although the
Bloomberg administration prevailed over various state law-based claims against the
Lease Cap Rules, the trial court acknowledged that its decision does not affect
whether the TLC's regulations are preempted by federal law. See Metro. Taxicab Bd.
of Trade v. New York City Taxi & Limousine Comm'n, No. 110594/09, 2009 WL
4016650, at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Nov. 18, 2009) (holding that TLC acted appropriately
within its authority regardless of whether regulations are preempted).
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sues. 179 Yet, it is uncertain whether fundamental policy change can
be achieved in the near future.180 Despite support by state and lo-
cal officials for bold new federal environmental regulations, the in-
fluence of industry organizations is strong and disagreement
persists over the role of federal preemption in any new legisla-
tion. 181 The failings of global climate change negotiations in Co-
penhagen and acrimony in Congress resulting from the debate over
health care reform further complicate efforts to overhaul federal
environmental laws. 182 As long as the current regulatory framework
remains, Metropolitan Taxicab serves as a significant impediment to
cities and states on the road to going green.
Paul Liebeskind*
179. See Klass, supra note 80, at 1671-72 (expressing negative opinion of EPCA
and CAA shared by some). According to critics, greater scientific evidence about
the scope and origin of major environmental challenges, such as climate change,
underscores the need for updated federal legislation. See id. at 1682.
180. See States Unite to Oppose Industry Efforts to Preempt GHG Programs, CLEAN
AIR REp., Aug. 23, 2007, 2007 WLNR 16316710 [hereinafter CLEAN AIR RP.] (dis-
cussing resistance of many state officials to continued federal preemption in realm
of environmental regulation). In June 2009, the House of Representatives passed
sweeping legislation, dubbed the American Clean Energy and Security Act, "in-
tended to address global warming and transform the way the nation produces and
uses energy." John M. Broder, House Passes Bill to Address Threat of Climate Change,
N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/27/us/politics/
27climate.html (reporting on House passage of much-anticipated climate change
bill). The outlook for this legislation is bleak, however, because climate change
has been pushed to the backburner as Congress addresses other pressing domestic
issues. See id. Moreover, sharp political divisions and regional differences in the
Senate make passage difficult. See id.
181. See CLEAN AIR REP., supra note 180 (portraying contest between propo-
nents of strong climate change legislation and lobbyists of polluting industries).
The National Governors Association and National Council of State Legislatures,
both representing officials from across the political spectrum, have spoken out
against federal preemption. See id. Simultaneously, "many industry organizations
have made federal preemption one of their top legislative priorities for any climate
change bill." Id. The result is mixed signals from federal lawmakers regarding
their positions on federal preemption. See id.
182. See Peter Baker, Compromising on 2 Issues, Obama Gets Partial Wins, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/20/us/politics/
20obama.html (describing how President Obama's policy agenda on health care
and climate change reform has given way to imperfect political compromises).
While nearly all of the countries attending the United Nations climate change con-
vention in Copenhagen, Denmark agreed to back an interim accord forged on the
final day of negotiations, many were disappointed that a stronger, binding agree-
ment could not be reached. See Andrew C. Revkin &John M. Broder, A Grudging
Accord in Climate Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/
12/20/science/earth/20accord.html (discussing international agreement to begin
taking certain actions to address global warming).
* J.D. Candidate, 2011, Villanova University School of Law; B.A., 2008,
Georgetown University.
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